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NOTE
NEW YORK'S CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURE: WAS IT WORTH THE
WAIT?
By amendment to the state constitution on November 6, 1985,
New York became the thirty-sixth state to allow its highest court
to entertain questions of state law certified to it by other courts.'
The amendment commanded the New York Court of Appeals to
adopt rules and procedures whereby federal appellate courts and
other states' highest courts could certify uncertain questions of
New York law directly to the Court of Appeals.2 The rules, as en-
acted, allow certification when it appears to the certifying court
"that determinative questions of New York Law are involved...
for which there is no controlling precedent of the Court of Ap-
peals."3 Within days of the enactment of the certification rules, the
I See N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 3(b)(9). The amendment provides:
The court of appeals shall adopt and from time to time may amend a rule to
permit the court to answer questions of New York law certified to it by the su-
preme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States or an
appellate court of last resort of another state, which may be determinative of the
cause then pending in the certifying court and which in the opinion of the certify-
ing court are not controlled by precedent in the decisions of the courts of New
York.
Id.; see Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis of State Laws Providing for Certification by
Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues of Law, 42 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 101 (1987)
[hereinafter Analysis of State Laws]. For a list of the states that allow certification, see
infra note 26.
1 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(9). The rules authorized by the constitutional amend-
ment were filed December 17, 1985, to be effective January 1, 1986. [1989] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §
500.17.
[1989] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 500.17(a). Section 500.17 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whenever it appears to the Supreme Court of the United States, any
United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last resort of any other state, that
determinative questions of New York law are involved in a cause pending before it
for which there is no controlling precedent of the Court of Appeals, such court
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was both praising the ad-
vent of certification and considering whether certification would be
proper under circumstances then confronting the court.4
The certification procedure has been in effect for nearly four
years, yet only two certified questions have been answered.5 The
initial flourish of excitement and adulation has been replaced by
may certify the dispositive questions of law to the Court of Appeals.
(b) The certifying court shall prepare a certificate which shall contain the
caption of the case, a statement of facts setting forth the nature of the cause and
the circumstances out of which the questions of New York law arise, and the ques-
tions of New York law, not controlled by precedent, which may be determinative,
together with a statement as to why the issue should be addressed in the Court of
Appeals at this time.
(c) The certificate, certified by the clerk of the certifying court under its offi-
cial seal, together with the original or copies of all relevant portions of the record
and other papers before the certifying court, as it may direct, shall be filed with
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at § 500.17.
While section 500.17 establishes that the acceptance of a certified question of state law
is within the discretion of the New York Court of Appeals, id. at § 500.17(d), the propriety
of certification in a federal case rests with the certifying court. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein,
416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). For examples of the factors a federal court might entertain when
considering certification, see id. at 394 (delay and expense); see also Cuesnongle v. Ramos,
835 F.2d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1987) (federal-state comity); Lee v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 306
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (degree of uncertainty and avoidance of guesswork); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (public importance of question); Harris v. Karri-
On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1981) (certification not requested until appeal);
Cantwell v. University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum); Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.) (inability to frame
issue), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976); Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514
F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1975) (possibility of repetition). See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS §
1371(e) (Official Draft 1969) (listing circumstances federal courts should consider before
certifying).
See Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 294 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986). The
Second Circuit stated: "[W]e have determined not to seek to avail ourselves of the proce-
dure in this case, happy as we are to have it available in the future." Id. By the time certifi-
cation became available in New York, this case was in an advanced procedural stage and for
that reason the court decided against its use. Id.
New York's certification procedure initially received enthusiastic responses. See, e.g.,
Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) ("valuable device for
securing prompt and authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law"); Siegel, A
Good Start for the New Certification Procedure Whereby the Court of Appeals Directly
Answers New York Law Questions for Other Courts, 329 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 1 (May 1986)
(same).
I See Loengard v. Santa Fe Indus., 70 N.Y.2d 262, 514 N.E.2d 113, 519 N.Y.S.2d 801
(1987) (minority shareholder's suit to recover damages for underpayment of shares following
merger); Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 343, 502 N.E.2d 168, 509 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1986) (department of Social Services lien on tort recovery not defeated by insurer's
prior payments).
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criticism as to the value and efficiency of the process adopted by
the New York Court of Appeals.'
This Note will assess the benefits of certification and attempt
to dispel the recent dissonance concerning its propriety. Part One
will discuss the history and background of certification generally.
Part Two will concentrate on New York's experience with certifica-
tion to date. Finally, Part Three will assess the future of New
York's certification procedure, offering suggestions to enable the
process to function more efficiently and effectively.
HISTORY OF CERTIFICATION
The United States Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,7 changed the way federal courts decide state law
claims. Prior to Erie, under the rule established in Swift v. Tyson,8
federal courts sitting in diversity had the option of applying fed-
eral common law in situations where there was no applicable state
statute.9 Erie was an attempt to discourage forum shopping and
' See Siegel, The Second Circuit Gets Some Mixed Signals From the New York Court
of Appeals About Certifying New York Law Questions, 346 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 1 (Oct.
1988).
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
See id. at 18-19. Swift involved a commercial law question of whether a preexisting
debt could be consideration for a contractual endorsement. Id. at 16. Federal and state deci-
sions on the issue conflicted. Id. Referring to section thirty-four of the Judiciary Act of
1789, the Rules of Decision Act, Justice Story concluded that the section did not apply to
questions of a general nature, not dependent upon local statutes. Id. at 18-19. "Swift...
held that federal courts ... need not.., apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by
its highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the
common law of the State is-or should be .... ." Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. For the text of the
Rules of Decision Act, see infra note 12.
Having opened a Pandora's box of problems concerning the delineation between "local"
and "general" law, the Swift decision was subject to criticism well before its rejection in
Erie. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Falrmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(regrettable that federal courts do not follow state courts); Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
464, 477 (1845) (McKinley, J., dissenting) (construction of Mississippi Supreme Court
should be binding on federal courts).
Perhaps the most blatant example of the injustice that Swift fostered is Black & White
Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). Brown & Yellow Taxicab
had a contract with a railroad for exclusive taxi service at its stations. Id. at 522. When
another cab company interfered, Brown & Yellow found no recourse under Kentucky law,
which considered such exclusive contracts to be against public policy. Id. at 523. To circum-
vent state law, Brown & Yellow reincorporated in Tennessee and brought a successful diver-
sity suit in federal court. Id. In dissent, Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Brandeis and
Stone, argued that the effect of Swift was an unconstitutional usurpation of states rights by
the United States. Id. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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avoid the disparate results that Swift had fostered.10 While some-
what successful in accomplishing that objective, Erie further man-
dated that federal courts apply state law even in situations where
state law was unsettled or unclear." Furthermore, although Erie
and its progeny require federal courts to adjudicate based upon
state law, the Rules of Decision Act designates the state as the fi-
nal arbiter of those laws.'2 When combined, these principles put
federal courts in the unenviable position of having to decide state
law-absent a controlling decision of the highest state
court-while lacking the authority to make the decision binding
upon anyone but the instant litigants. 3 Often, this inherent prob-
Black & White is illustrative of Swift's two greatest evils, forum shopping and inconsis-
tent results. It was undisputed that the law of Kentucky was settled, Id. at 526, and was
unfavorable to the interests of Brown & Yellow. Id. By reincorporating outside Kentucky,
Brown & Yellow was able to achieve a result in contravention of Kentucky law. Id. at 531.
o See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64. Erie was a personal injury action in which the common law
of Pennsylvania was in conflict with the "general common law." Id. at 69-70. Justice Bran-
deis, writing for the Court, noted that "the [Swift] doctrine rendered impossible equal pro-
tection of the law," id. at 75, and that "Congress ha[d] no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a State." Id. at 78; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945). Referring to Erie, the Guaranty Trust Court observed that "the intent of
[Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of diversity of citizenship . . . the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same ... as it would be if tried in a State court." Id.; see also
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir.) ("This approach recog-
nizes that it is basically unfair for decision to turn on irrelevant accidents such as state
citizenship, residence, geography, or the case being filed in one courthouse, rather than in
the one a block down the street"), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
" See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no
federal general common law." Id; see also Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237
(1943) ("Erie... placed on [the federal courts] a greater responsibility for determining and
applying state laws in all cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does not gov-
ern"). See generally Brown, Fifth Circuit Certification - Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L.
REv. 455, 455 (1977) (Erie rule often requires federal judges to play role of prophet in inter-
preting and applying state substantive law).
" See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The law states: "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
" See United States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1373 n.5 (5th Cir. 1972). "[The] stare
decisis effect is entirely within the control of the Supreme Court of Louisiana under its
power to alter, modify or reverse . . . [or] reject the reading which the Fifth Circuit has
given to the pertinent state law." Id.; United Serus. Life Ins. Co., 328 F.2d at 487 (Brown,
C.J., concurring).
Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit discussed his experience with the Erie mandate
as follows:
It has been awkward-and, to some, not a little embarrassing-when our first
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lem is then exacerbated when other federal courts or foreign state
courts, ruling on similar issues, use the possibly incorrect holding
of the first federal court as authority in their rulings on the same
law.14 This domino effect continues until broken by a final decision
in the highest court of the state whose law is in question. 15
To cope with this problematic directive, the judiciary created
the discriminating doctrine of abstention, 6 which allows a federal
court to send litigants into state court for a declaratory judgment
or, in extreme applications, to dismiss the entire action, thus re-
quiring the parties to seek state court relief.' 7 Criticized for deny-
guess turns out to be wrong and the state court makes the second and last guess
by reversing our holding. But more important than possible embarrassment is the
frustration for litigants when the rule of law we prescribe turns out to be a ticket
for one ride only. There is no certainty in the judicial system where a federal court
decision has both res judicata and collateral estoppel effect on the particular par-
ties to the litigation but due to subsequent state decision to the contrary has no
stare decisis effect.
Brown, supra note 11, at 455-56 (footnote omitted).
" See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981) (other
federal courts should defer to holding of pertinent court of appeals absent clear signals from
state's highest court suggesting incorrectness), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Aldens, Inc.
v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979) ("sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves great
weight"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); see also Note, Intercircuit Deference in Diver-
sity Cases: Respect for Expertise or Judicial Ventriloquism?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62, 62
(1982) ("The Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals ... have deferred to a district
court's interpretation").
," See, e.g., Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir.
1975) (discussing frequency of federal court "reversals" by highest state court); United
Servs. Life Ins. Co., 328 F.2d at 486 (Brown, C.J., concurring) (Texas and Alabama have
overruled this court "and the score in Florida cases is little short of staggering"); Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730, 733-34 (Fla. 1961) (disapproving holding of store
keeper liability in Pogue v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957)); Arring-
ton v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941,
944 (1982) (refusing to follow Second Circuit's interpretation in Birnbaum v. United States,
588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seel-
bach, 161 Tex. 250, 257, 339 S.W.2d 521, 525 (1960) (expressly rejecting evidentiary ruling in
National Sur. Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957)); Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 458 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960) (declining to follow and distin-
guishing Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 952 (1960)).
1" See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (noting earlier Su-
preme Court rulings supporting abstention); UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT
§ 1, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1967) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT] (discussing origins of abstention); Roth,
Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1, 5 (1979) (considering utility of abstention in maintaining policies formulated in Erie). See
generally 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§
4241-4247 (2d ed. 1988) (history and development of abstention).
'7 See Roth, supra note 16, at 5; Note, Inter-jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Ab-
stention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 350 (1963).
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ing plaintiffs their right to a federal forum,I8 the practice of ab-
stention often proved wasteful and time-consuming.'9 Out of this
befuddled legal quagmire evolved the "redeeming light" of certifi-
cation.20 Endowed with all the benefits of abstention without the
attendant drawbacks, certification was hailed as the solution to the
guess-or-abstain dilemma."'
'8 See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-36 (1943). The Winter Haven
Court noted the difficulty in reconciling abstention with the congressional policy favoring
the availability of a federal forum through diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 236. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Stone found "no [congressional] policy which would exclude cases from
the jurisdiction merely because... the law is uncertain or difficult to determine." Id. Subse-
quent to Winter Haven the Supreme Court spoke again of its dissatisfaction with absten-
tion: "[Tihe mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to
a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit." Lehman Bros. v. Schlein, 416 U.S. 386, 390
(1974); see also 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 16, § 4248, at 158
(abstention held improper "merely because" state law unclear). See generally Mattis, Certi-
fication of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal
Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 719 (1969) (abstention not "particularly bright chapter in
the history of American jurisprudence").
11 See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418
(1964) (discussing "delay and expense to which . . . abstention doctrine inevitably gives
rise"); Corr & Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 411, 415 (1988); Roth, supra note 16, at 6; see also Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional
Certification: A Reexamination to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 21,
26 (1969) ("some litigants spend[] up to nine years in federal and state courts"); Note,
supra note 17, at 346-47 ("delay may be magnified if the propriety of abstention was liti-
gated in the federal system prior to the separate state action, and is increased when the case
returns to the federal district court for final adjudication subject to further federal appellate
review") (footnote omitted).
20 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375-76 (Fla. 1978). In Mobil, the court
observed that "[tihe certification process was initiated to eliminate both the expense and
delay of abstention, by permitting the federal litigation to be abated while the doubtful
question of state law was referred directly to the highest state court for resolution." Id.
(footnote omitted); see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 19, at 413 (certification permits
courts to decide cases they would otherwise refuse to decide, due to another jurisdiction's
unsettled law). But see Mattis, supra note 18, at 725 (federal case took 11 years to decide
due to certification process). Certification may be viewed as an outgrowth of both the Erie
decision and general dissatisfaction with abstention. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 19, at
414-16.
2 See, e.g., Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391 (certification "save[s] time, energy, and re-
sources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism"); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363
U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (certification praised for allowing authoritative state court determina-
tion of unsettled local law); Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 274 (5th
Cir.) (noting approval of certification by both Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966) (noting Supreme
Court approval of certification was a process); see also UNIFORM ACT, supra note 16, at 50
(certification "much more orderly way of handling the problem" than abstention). See gen-
erally Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 413, pas-
sim (1962) (comparison of certification's efficacy to that of abstention).
1989] CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
A reaction to the malfunctioning abstention doctrine, certifica-
tion permitted a federal court to retain jurisdiction over a case and
obtain a definitive determination of state law.2' The first certifica-
tion statute was enacted in Florida in 1945,23 where it lay dormant
for over fifteen years until thrust into the limelight by the Su-
preme Court in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.24 Calling the
Florida statute an example of "rare foresight," the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit with the implication that
the court ought to certify the unresolved state law questions to the
Florida courts.25 Certification procedures are now available in at
least thirty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico.26
NEW YORK'S EXPERIENCE
The New York amendment was, with limited exceptions, an
adoption of the wording contained in the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act.2 7 While most states have adopted the Uni-
22 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23098, § 1 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1977)). See generally
Kaplan, supra note 21, at 1 (discussing history of Flordia statute); Roth, supra note 16, at
1-10 (same).
24 363 U.S. 207 (1960). In Clay, the Supreme Court suggested that the Fifth Circuit
utilize Florida's certification statute to determine the validity of a contractual clause in an
Illinois insurance contract. Id. at 212. The clause in question required that a suit to recover
on the insurance contract be brought within 12 months of the claim's discovery. Id. at 208.
The Court indicated that the circuit court had incorrectly turned to the constitutional
ramifications of the clause before looking to Florida law which might avoid the necessity of
constitutional interpretation. Id. at 209-10.
25 Id. at 212.
21 See Analysis of State Laws, supra note 1, at 126-54; 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 16, at § 4248. A compilation of the data contained in the two above
sources reveals that certification statutes have been adopted in the following states, districts
and territories: Alabama*, Alaska, Arizona*, Colorado*, Connecticut*, Delaware*, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho*, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa*, Kansas*, Ken-
tucky*, Louisiana, Maine*, Maryland*, Massachusetts*, Michigan*, Minnesota*, Mississi
ppi, Montana * , Nebraska*, New Hampshire*, New Mexico*, New York, North Dakota*,
Oklahoma*, Oregon*, Puerto Rico*, Rhode Island*, South Carolina*, South Dakota*, Texas,
Washinton*, West Virginia*, Wisconsin*, Wyoming*. In addition to allowing certified ques-
tions from the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals, the
states listed with an asterisk also allow certification from United States district courts. Id.
27 See UNIFORM AcT, supra note 16, § 1 at 52. Section one of the Act provides:
The [highest court of any state] may answer questions of law certified to it by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a
United States District Court [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate
appellate court of any other state], when requested by the certifying court if there
are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may
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form Act's general wording, some differ as to the inclusion or ex-
clusion of certification by district courts or other states' highest
courts.2 New York allows certification by the highest courts of sis-
ter states, but excludes district court certification. 29 To date, only
the Second Circuit has certified questions to the New York Court
of Appeals.30 Two questions have been answered, 1 one was de-
clined, 32 and one was accepted but, following briefs and oral argu-
ments, returned unanswered.33 On at least two other occasions, cer-
tification has been considered and rejected at the federal level. 4
All the New York decisions regarding whether to answer certified
questions have been unanimous.35
The first case certified to the New York Court of Appeals was
Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc.36 The certified question was
accepted, answered, and returned without comment on the certifi-
cation process itself.37 In Rufino v. United States, s the New York
be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which
it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions
of the [highest court] [and the intermediate appellate courts] of this state.
Id. The differences from New York's constitutional amendment and procedure are slight.
See supra notes 1 and 3.
28 See supra note 26 (indicating which states permit district court certification). The
only other major difference among the various states' statutes concerns whether a certified
question "may" or "must" be determinative of the cause pending in the certifying court. See
Analysis of State Laws, supra note 1, at 126-54; UNIFORM ACT, supra note 16, §§ 1-8, at 52-
55.
29 See supra note 26.
"0 See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 838 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988); Rufino v.
United States, 829 F.2d 354, 359 n.7 (2d Cir. 1987) (certified from Second Circuit in unpub-
lished proceedings); Loengard v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 812 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1987); Kidney
v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1987).
"1 See Loengard v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 262, 267, 514 N.E.2d 113, 115, 519
N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1987); Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 343, 346-47, 502
N.E.2d 168, 170, 509 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1986).
22 See Rufino v. United States, 69 N.Y.2d 310, 312, 506 N.E.2d 910, 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d
200, 201 (1987).
"2 See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788, 791, 525 N.E.2d 737, 738,
530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (1988).
24 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 n.5 (2d Cir. 1987) (unlikely that issue
will recur), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2823 (1988); Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285,
294 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986) (proceeding was at advanced stage).
"' See Retail Software, 71 N.Y.2d at 791, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 93; Loen-
gard, 70 N.Y.2d at 267, 514 N.E.2d at 115, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 804; Rufino, 69 N.Y.2d at 312,
506 N.E.2d at 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 201; Kidney, 68 N.Y.2d at 346, 502 N.E.2d at 170, 509
N.Y.S.2d at 493.
se 68 N.Y.2d 343, 502 N.E.2d 168, 509 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1986).
' See id. at 345-46, 502 N.E.2d at 169-70, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93. Kidney involved a
question of statutory interpretation that had never been considered by New York courts. Id.
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Court of Appeals was faced with a second request for certification;
however, the request was rejected by the New York court.-9 Al-
though the questions concerned an unclear area of state law and
would have otherwise been acceptable to the court, there was a
case pending before the New York Appellate Division based on
identical issues, the outcome of which would be determinative of
the certified questions and thus, the federal case.40 The court
feared that answering the certified question would interfere with
the ongoing state process. 41 Additionally, although abstention is at
times criticized, the case presented a textbook example of when
abstention is justified.42 In the third case, Loengard v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals accepted and de-
cided a certified question without comment on the certification
procedure, just as it had done in Kidney.43
On appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the
Second Circuit, finding no state cases on point and considering the question "likely to recur
with some frequency," seized the opportunity to certify. Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories,
Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987). Unlike the New York court, the Second Circuit did
comment on the procedure at length, incorporating its certification request into its opinion
"[b]oth to enhance understanding ... and to provide an illustration." Id. at 956.
69 N.Y.2d 310, 506 N.E.2d 910, 514 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1987).
See id. at 311-12, 506 N.E.2d at 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
'0 See id. The New York Court of Appeals noted that "[tlhe very questions now ten-
dered for our review were only recently answered by Supreme Court, New York County, in
McDougald v. Garber (132 Misc 2d 457), and are the subject of an appeal currently going
forward in the Appellate Division, First Department." Id. at 311, 506 N.E.2d at 911, 514
N.Y.S.2d at 201.
41 See id. at 311-12, 506 N.E.2d at 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 201. "Were we to undertake to
answer the certified questions now, by... responding to specific questions from the Federal
court rather than deciding a case fully before us for review, we would necessarily affect the
ordinary State procedure now in actual progress for the resolution of these issues." Id.; see
also Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 359 n.7 (2d Cir. 1987) ("we fully appreciate [the
New York Court of Appeals'] preference ... to allow significant issues arising under state
law to be resolved according to the State's usual process").
42 See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971) (abstention considered since there
existed state case addressing question on state grounds); cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven 320
U.S. 228, 237 (1943) (abstention unwarranted where "[n]o litigation is pending in the state
courts in which the questions here presented could be decided").
The propriety of abstention in Rufino is further illustrated by the fact that McDougald
v. Garber, 132 Misc. 2d 457, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), aff'd, 135 App.
Div. 2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1988), rev'd, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989), upon which the Second Circuit based its decision, was thereafter re-
versed by the Court of Appeals. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989);
see also Siegel, Court of Appeals Rejects "Loss of Enjoyment of Life" As Compensable
Damage Element Distinct from Pain and Suffering, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., February 1989, at 2
(discussing McDougald and its relationship and effect with respect to Rufino).
43 70 N.Y.2d 262, 514 N.E.2d 113, 519 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1987).
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The fourth and most recent case to be certified to the New
York Court of Appeals, as well as the most procedurally complex,
was Retail Software Services, Inc. v Lashlee." In Retail Software,
the plaintiff commenced an action in the United States District
Court against three of the principals of a California franchisor, al-
leging, inter alia, a violation of New York's Franchise Sales Act
("FSA").4 The defendants moved for dismissal on the ground that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction.4" The plaintiff argued that
jurisdiction was proper under both FSA section 686 and New
York's Long Arm Statute, section 302 of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules ("CPLR").47 The district court held that the FSA did
not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction and that the applica-
tion of CPLR section 302 in this instance would violate notions of
"fair play and substantial justice" as set forth by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 Accordingly, the
district court dismissed the case.49
On appeal,50 the plaintiff argued that section 691(3) of the
FSA removed the protection offered by the corporate veil for any
corporate officer who "materially aids in the act of transaction con-
stituting the violation." 51 When combined with the service of pro-
cess designation of FSA section 686, it was argued that section
691(3) created a basis of jurisdiction over nonresident corporate of-
" 71 N.Y.2d 788, 525 N.E.2d 737, 530 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988).
" See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1988). Retail
Software Services ("Retail") a New York corporation, brought suit against Software Centre
International ("SCI") alleging that SCI had fraudulently misrepresented its financial condi-
tion, inducing Retail to purchase SCI's obsolete goods. Id. at 19-20. Retail claimed violations
of civil RICO and New York's Franchise Sales Act as well as common law fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 19; see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 680-695 (McKinney 1984) (Franchise
Sales Act).
46 See Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 20.
4 Id.; see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(1), (2) & (3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1989) (New York's "long arm" statute). Although the FSA sets forth specific methods for
service of process, it does not indicate whether these methods alone constitute an indepen-
dent basis of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 686 (Mc-
Kinney 1984).
48 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
49 See Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 20. The district court also ruled that it would have
been unfair to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the New York courts due to a lack
of minimum contacts with New York. Id. The court, although disapproving of the concept,
felt that the corporation acted as a shield to prevent the jurisdictional attachment of the
corporate officers, who merely acted through the corporation. Id.
10 Id. at 21.
11 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 691(3) (McKinney 1984).
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ficers or directors. 2 Finding the statutory interpretation question
one of first impression in New York, the Second Circuit certified it
to the New York Court of Appeals. 3
After considering the certification request, the New York court
felt that to answer the question would violate the rules of the court
as well as the constitutional grant of authority, which required that
the question be one which "may be determinative" of the cause
then pending in the certifying court.5 4 The court reasoned as
follows:
If we were to answer the question, as framed, in the affirmative,
we would establish only the abstract proposition that, in some cir-
cumstances, section 686 provides a basis for jurisdiction ....
[E]ven if this court were to conclude that this statute did not pro-
vide a basis for personal jurisdiction, that answer would not be
determinative here, since the question would remain whether our
long-arm statute (CPLR 302) makes these defendants amenable
to suit in this State in any event.51
To overcome the abstract nature of an affirmative answer, the
court felt that it would have had to consider the constitutionality
of section 686 as applied to the facts of the case. 6 This it was
neither asked nor at liberty to do.57 Exercising its discretion, the
court sent the unanswered question back to the Second Circuit.5 8
The snafu here was that the district court had already ruled
that it would be unconstitutional to haul these defendants into a
New York court, regardless of the proffered jurisdictional justifica-
12 Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 21. Section 691 provides for the liability of corporate
officers and directors in connection with section 686. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 691 (Mc-
Kinney 1984). Section 686 designates the New York Secretary of State as the agent for
service of process upon corporate officers and directors. Id. at § 686.
" See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 838 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1988). The
Second Circuit found insufficient state law upon which to reach a conclusion without engag-
ing in conjecture. Id.
" See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y. 2d 788, 790, 525 N.E.2d 737, 738,
530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1988); supra notes 1 and 3 and accompanying text.
*' Id. at 790-91, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93 (1988). The court added,
"[i]n addition, the certified question asks only whether the statute provides a basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction as well as a method for service of process, but we cannot answer that
question in a vacuum, divorced from the consideration of the constitutionality of the statute
in its actual application." Id. at 791, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
"' See id. To rule on the issue of constitutionality would have had the effect of position-
ing the New York court as an appellate court to the federal district court on a federal con-
stitutional question rather than a question of state law. See infra note 60.
" See Retail Software, 71 N.Y.2d at 791, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
58 Id.
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tion under state law.5 9 In the hierarchy of adjudication, courts are
to consider state law first, constitutional issues last.6 0 Here, how-
ever, the district court had already considered and ruled on the
constitutional issue. Regardless of which New York law applied,
the constitutional roadblock remained; the choice of section 686 or
302 would not change the constitutional objection that application
of either statute violated International Shoe, thus rendering any
interpretation of 686 irrelevant to the outcome.6 In other words, if
the New York Court of Appeals had determined that section 686
granted jurisdiction, its determination would have been meaning-
less because the district court already had held that even if the
statute permitted jurisdiction, the Constitution did not.2
While closing the door on the Second Circuit's certification re-
quest,6 3 the "unanswered reply" that the New York Court of Ap-
peals returned actually contained the key for unlocking it.6 4 Subse-
quent to the district court's holding, but prior to declining the
certified question, the New York court decided two cases regarding
section 302, finding in both that it was not unconstitutional to sub-
ject defendants to the jurisdiction of the New York courts under
circumstances similar to those in Retail Software. 5 Thus, were the
Second Circuit to reverse the district court's ruling on constitu-
tionality, an essential prerequisite to statutory consideration but
" See Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1988).
" See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1960) (constitutional issue
should have been reached only if decision was compelled); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) ("Court will not pass upon a constitutional question ... if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of"); Burton
v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) (same); Liverpool v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (same).
6 See Retail Software, 71 N.Y.2d at 790-91, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93.
In holding that "officers... can[not] be deemed to have acted through their corporation in
transacting business or causing a tort within the state," the district court ruled that mini-
mum contacts were not met by the individual defendant. See Retail Software, 854 F.2d at
20. Therefore, neither statute would affect the ultimate outcome of the jurisdictional ques-
tion, once lack of minimum contacts was determined. See Retail Software, 71 N.Y.2d at 791,
525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
62 See Retail Software, 71 N.Y. 2d at 791, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92. Thus,
because of the lack of minimum contacts, the court decided that regardless of how it "might
respond to the question [its] answer would not be meaningful." Id.
63 See id. at 789, 525 N.E.2d at 737, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
64 See id. at 790 n.*, 525 N.E.2d at 738 n.*, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92 n.*. "We note that the
District Court's decision preceded our discussions of the fiduciary shield doctrine in Kreut-
ter v. McFadden Oil Corp. (71 N.Y.2d 460) and CPC Intl. v. McKesson Corp. (70 N.Y.2d
268)." Id.
6 See id. at 789, 525 N.E.2d at 737, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
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something the New York court was not in a legal position to sug-
gest, it would have had at its disposal the state court decisions
holding that section 302 did confer jurisdiction upon these defend-
ants.6 It seems that the New York court actually sent back the
answer, concealed within a footnote of the declination, which
would permit the Second Circuit to authoritatively resolve the
state law question without reference to section 686. This is borne
out by the subsequent opinion of the Second Circuit, which held
that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the FSA
creates a basis for personal jurisdiction because a recent New York
Court of Appeals decision had indicated that New York's long-arm
statute provided "a more than adequate basis ... for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. 67 By reversing the district court's holding
on constitutionality, the Second Circuit "opened the door" to the
proper interpretation of state law, the result it had sought through
its original certification. 8 To paraphrase Judge Frank, never have
ventriloquist and dummy performed in such perfect unison.6 9
Without the New York court's lips moving, the Second Circuit
spoke its words.70
NEW YORK CERTIFICATION'S FUTURE
The future success of New York's certification procedure re-
quires a combination and coordination of the efforts of federal
courts-especially the Second Circuit-with those of the state.
Teamwork between the two is essential, since it is a waste of both
time and judicial resources for the federal court to certify unac-
ceptable questions, and for the state court to consider and reject
them. Necessary for efficient operation is a template whereby the
"8 See id.; supra note 56.
1 Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988).
'8 See Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 23-24. "The defendants in this case have greater
contacts with New York than the Burger King defendant did with Florida .... [The de-
fendants] reached into New York ... stood to benefit ... [and] received explicit notice,
through the FSA, that they would be individually liable ..." Id. at 23. "We conclude that
the limits of the due process clause will not be exceeded in this case by effectuating the
statutorily expressed intent of the New York legislature." Id. at 24.
60 See Richardson v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). Speaking for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Frank characterized the federal court's role after the Erie
decision as that of a "ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state." Id.
70 See Retail Software, 71 N.Y.2d at 790, 525 N.E.2d at 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 92. The
initial refusal to answer the question pointed the Second Circuit toward a source of author-
ity. See supra note 64. It is suggested that utilizing this clue, the Second Circuit reached the
proper result.
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
federal court is made aware of the requirements and guidelines for
acceptability by the state court. This template happens to be a
natural by-product of case law development; questions answered
demonstrate acceptability and those rejected establish areas to be
avoided in the future. It is submitted that although cases such as
Rufino, in which the federal court is merely unaware of the pend-
ing state court litigation, are difficult to avoid, recurrences of the
Retail Software situation are preventable. The court considering
certification need only examine the ruling below and ask itself
whether it is possible that the certified question may dispose of the
case. If the answer is no, Retail Software demonstrates that it is
simply not proper to certify.
From New York's standpoint, it is imperative to the creation
of this framework that the New York court articulate any
problems presented by a certified question and offer possible sug-
gestions for their elimination. For example, if rephrasing the ques-
tion would make it acceptable, the court should emphasize this,
and possibly add a recommendation that, had the certifying court
authorized the rephrasing in its request, as some courts do,71 the
New York court would not have had to send the question back
unanswered. If New York encounters problems of incomplete or
piecemeal records, putting the federal court on notice would allow
the correction of this flaw by the inclusion of complete certified
records when confusion is anticipated. 2
Furthermore, New York's certification procedures contain un-
tested applications. 3 An example would involve injuries caused by
such substances as asbestos or diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), and the
71 See, e.g., Waters v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 773 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1985)
(federal court's non-exclusive formulation enables state court to fashion the basic issues in
any appropriate manner); Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1971)
("we wish that the Court exercise the widest discretioh ... including... a complete refor-
mulation of the certified questions"). See generally Brown, supra note 11, at 461 (allowing
state court to reformulate certified question avoids delay and waste of judicial resources).
7'2 See, e.g., Allen, 446 F.2d at 1280 (entire record transmitted); Note, supra note 17, at
352 ("rather than certifying a question that would necessarily be hypothetical because not
presented in a context of related and necessary facts and issues of law, the federal court
should send to the state court... the entire record in order to guarantee a concrete setting
of interrelated issues").
7 See [1989] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 500.17(a). An example not discussed within this Note is
state-to-state certification. New York's procedure allows sister states to certify questions to




various tort theories created to deal with such injuries. 74 Although
today's technology makes it possible to identify the medical cause
of injurious effects manifesting themselves over a decade after the
occurrence, it does nothing to improve records or memories over
this same time period. 5 Often, the result is the ability to identify
the cause of the tort without the ability to identify the tortfeasor.76
7' See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
In this recent DES liability case, the Court of Appeals formulated a new rule regarding
defendant drug manufacturers' liability with respect to plaintiffs who claim DES related
injuries. Due to the difficulties which plaintiffs faced in proving which DES manufacturer's
drugs caused their injuries, the new ruling subjects all named defendants to liability for
plaintiffs' DES related injuries, regardless of whether the defendants can prove that their
drugs were not taken by plaintiffs' mothers. See id. at 506-07, 539 N.E.2d at 1074-75, 541
N.Y.S.2d at 946-47. The new rule imposes only several liability upon the defendants, and
each defendant's share of liability is directly proportional to its relative market share owner-
ship of the national DES market. See id. at 511-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1077-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at
949-50. Under prior New York law, a plaintiff could recover jointly and severally from any
or all defendant manufacturers based on an alternative liability or a concerted action liabil-
ity theory. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 580-82, 580 n.5, 436 N.E.2d 182,
450 N.Y.S. 2d 776 (1982). Under an alternative liability or concerted liability theory, how-
ever, a defendant manufacturer could be exculpated by proving that a plaintiff's mother
ingested other DES drugs than that which the manufacturer had produced. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment d (1977).
Hypothetically, if the Second Circuit had to decide a similar DES case based on New
York law, before the Hymowitz ruling was handed down, it is submitted that the Second
Circuit's foresight would have been askew as to the true direction of New York law. In
Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit denied a plaintiff's
request for certification of a question which was similar to the issue presented to the New
York Court of Appeals in Hymowitz. See Tidier, 851 F.2d at 420. However, the federal court
denied the plaintiff's motion and ultimately denied the plaintiff recovery by refusing to
adopt the market share theory of liability. See id. at 421. It is submitted, therefore, that in
the hypothetical scenario presented above, a federal court's refusal to certify such a question
to the state court would be inapposite and an encroachment upon a state's right to speak
the law.
7 See, e.g., Tidler, 851 F.2d at 421 (plaintiffs "are unable to identify the firm that
manufactured the DES"); Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 595, 607 P.2d 924,
926, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (Manufacturers do not maintain records of users; "pharmacists
filled prescriptions from whatever brand of the drug happened to be in stock"; mother failed
to keep records or remember brand), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1979); Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 66-67, 289 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1979) (medical and pharmacological
records destroyed), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 558, 420 A.2d 1305, 1308 (1980) ("generation has passed ... no records have
been maintained"); Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779
("DES was manufactured and prescribed generically"; patient, physician, pharmacist and
drug company records disappeared; individuals' recollections obliterated by time).
71 See, e.g., Tidler, 851 F.2d at 421 (victims, their parents, physicians and pharmacists,
unable to identify firm that manufactured DES to which they were exposed); Ferrigno, 175
N.J. Super. at 558, 420 A.2d at 1308 (plaintiffs and mothers unable to link the pills used to
the manufacturing drug company); Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 779 (identity of drug company whose DES tablets were ingested can never accu-
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While the injustice apparent here is causing states to change their
tort theories," it has been suggested that it would be improper to
invoke certification where the law is clear, regardless of whether
the state would be moved to adopt an alternative theory of liability
to avoid the injustice.78 This may prove to be an extreme approach,
arising from the negative reception which abstention has received,
coupled with a misguided loyalty to Erie.7 9 While Erie should com-
mand loyalty, one of its underlying principles was to avoid incon-
sistent outcomes.8 0 If a federal court believes that a state court
would change its clear, unambiguous, existing law if presented with
the facts, it is a dereliction of Erie's intent, if not its precise lan-
guage, not to submit the question to the state.81 For, if the federal
court believes that the state might change its law if faced with the
rately be determined).
" See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The
Sindell Court reasoned as follows:
[A]dvances in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm con-
sumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the
courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those
injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.
Id.; see also Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 579-80, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779 ("Prod-
ucts liability law cannot be expected to stand still where innocent victims face 'inordinately
difficult problems of proof ").
8 See Tidler, 851 F.2d at 425. The Tidler court inferred that, like it or not, it must
apply the law of the state as it finds it. Id. "It is decidedly not the business of the federal
courts to alter or augment state law to meet the felt necessities of the case .. " Id. (em-
phasis added). "[F]ederal courts... are obligated to apply ... existing state law." Id. at 426
(emphasis added).
The reasoning advanced by the court is based upon the premise that a federal court
sitting in diversity is not in a position to change or restructure state law, nor to apply that
law in other than traditional directions. See id. at 424-26. "'A federal court... is not free to
engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves
to the federal court. . . .' "Id. at 424 (quoting Day and Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423
U.S. 3, 4 (1975)). "Thus, we take the law of the appropriate jurisdiction as we find it; and we
leave it undisturbed." Id.; cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (certification was proper to allow state opportunity to decide DES litigation because
,'massive DES litigation continues to loom as people who believe they are DES victims seek
a measure of compensation and redress in courts of law").
7' See Note, supra note 19, at 29. One reason for this confusion over proper use of
certification is that the Winter Haven restrictions applicable to abstention have been "erro-
neous[ly]" applied to certification by a limited number of both federal courts and commen-
tators. Id.; see Kaplan, supra note 21, at 433 ("this procedure can be used only in those
cases which require the operation of abstention and not in all cases involving issues of
uncertain state law").
80 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Erie).
81 See Brown, supra note 11, at 458. Chief Judge Brown stated: "It is entirely proper
and appropriate that a federal court freely certify questions to any state court when the
need arises and a state procedure is available." Id.
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facts before the federal court, but refuses to allow certification, the
federal court is once again dictating state law as in Swift v. Tyson,
and a return to forum shopping and inconsistent outcomes would
be the logical result.
CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals and the federal courts (or
sister states' high courts) should be as free, open and candid with
each other as possible to maximize the advantages to be gained
through certification. Certification enables federal courts to obtain
guidance when faced with the difficult questions necessitated by
Erie. Certification further grants state courts respect and defer-
ence, returning to them the power to decide state law questions as
guaranteed by Congress, thus enhancing federal-state comity. Con-
sidering the options, certification is an undisputed boon to justice
as well as to litigants. Acting as a proverbial lifeboat in a turbulent
legal sea, certification ensures that both federal and state courts, as
well as the concerned parties, reach terra firma. Although new to
the helm, New York's Court of Appeals is thus far handling the
waves admirably.
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